Eve is here. I must confess that I have been keeping an eye on Russiaball, other than paying some attention to the escalating movements of very bellicose noises and plans emanating from European countries and threats against Russian shipping. But Trump is now doubling down on failure. He is reconnecting with Europe, which he dismissed as a loser and deprioritized his national security strategy. His initial urge to end the Ukraine conflict and improve relations with China may not have been enough to pull Russia away from China, but it may have prompted Russia to pursue a complex balancing act with some consideration for U.S. interests. However, President Trump was unable to implement the “Spirit of Alaska” plan. The logical inference is that President Trump promised action on Ukraine, but President Zelenskiy vetoed it.
So Trump is back to helping Ukraine to weaken Russia…the old Biden plan. And because the United States is overextended and especially under-armed, this also weakens America’s ability to attack China, its claimed arch-enemy. This is yet another example of President Trump ignoring Sun Tzu’s words, “All tactics and strategies are noise before defeat.”
Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the new Cold War. He holds a doctorate from MGIMO, which is affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Originally published on his website.
President Trump’s decision to sign the G7 Leaders’ Joint Statement on Geopolitical Issues, which calls for additional arms against Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, signaled that he intends to “escalate toward de-escalation” (E2DE) through a “war of attrition” waged by Ukraine. The EU fully supports this campaign, and Trump 2.0 will seek to gain control of Russian natural resource companies as a top priority through forced sale of shares, under pain of continued NATO-backed attacks on related infrastructure by Ukraine, if Putin vetoes them.
The contours of the administration’s E2DE strategy are beginning to take shape. Almost two weeks before he signed the above joint statement, the House of Representatives passed the following bill:[e] Over $1 billion in security and recovery assistance. “This will make an additional $8 billion available for Ukraine’s defense through loans.” Later, on the sidelines of the G7 summit, President Trump said he would soon reimpose oil sanctions against Russia, which would disrupt President Putin’s Sino-India balancing policy.
Around the same time, “a group of U.S. senators introduced a bill to amend current law that would allow Ukraine to use assets confiscated from the Russian Central Bank and other Russian state assets to purchase military equipment.” All of this coincides with reports that the Senate has introduced language in the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) calling for continued intelligence assistance to Ukraine throughout the next year to aid in its quest to regain lost land (and likely more).
What’s more, President Zelenskiy soon expressed confidence that he would follow through on President Trump’s clearly communicated interest in allowing American companies to manufacture air defense missiles (and possibly other weapons) in Ukraine, thus significantly raising the stakes if Russia were to attack these facilities. Of course, it will take time for the United States to replenish its missile stockpile after the third Gulf War, but the writing is on the wall that Trump 2.0 is preparing to radically escalate the Ukraine conflict.
Specifically, its E2DE strategy is expected to closely follow what the Wall Street Journal outlined last fall and analyzed here at the time: helping Ukraine surpass Russia’s drone capabilities, tightening secondary sanctions, and provoking unrest within Russia. To that end, the House and Senate efforts would strengthen Ukraine’s offensive capabilities (including long-range missiles) while addressing the second part of President Trump’s sanctions threat. This combination could cause unrest within Russia.
To be clear, that final stage is unlikely to ever materialize, as the diverse Russian population keenly understands the existential risks of this conflict, remains united, and is less inclined to protest regarding the grand strategic goal of “Balkanizing” a civilized nation. But the United States is still preparing to take steps in the hope that it can at least muster enough disapproval of the status quo to force the ruling United Russia party into a coalition after the next Duma elections in September.
Looking ahead, the groundwork is rapidly being laid for Trump 2.0 to be all about Russia next year, and this could be facilitated by the possibility of Democrats taking back Congress, or at least one chamber, after the November midterm elections. If Russia fails to meet its goals before that happens, or does not reach a fairly fair deal by then, the only realistic chance of such a deal is 2029 at the earliest, meaning that until then, there is only victory or defeat. The clock is ticking.
