Barry Lamb acknowledged that in his investigation there is a strong argument in favour of a legal approach, as to why we should move away from legalism in a modest direction. The HIV analysis of legalism continues by looking at what he sees as a donkey and looking at the pressure of choice that leads to legalism becoming more entrenched in social institutions. The first law of identification in Bureaudynamics Lam is:
Rules and their management have become more complex over time.
This play can be seen in many ways. Small and medium-sized businesses and startups can have rather vague, open-ended pollies that give a wide latitude for discretion. Large multinationals have Venbus’ writings on the policies and procedures of companies that attempt to spell out how to act in event edge cases. You can see this process happen as startups grow and eventually become large companies. As Lamb says:
There is a natural evolution in managing rules within an organization. So over time, rules and their management become longer and more complicated, never shorter or simpler.
This is almost a process and isn’t completely worthless. This is because making rules more detailed and specific can help to unleash two important values: the rules or law.
Fairness requires that rules need to fully inform people about compliance requirements. Law philosophers call this the pedagogical value of law.
If rules or laws are vague and unclear, it is difficult to know that certain people need to do their own thing to avoid breaching the rules. If you have a clear understanding of which actions extend or out of bounds, you are subject to arbitrary enforcement. This same issue provides another important value that reflects the guidance values of the law’s subjects – Thuee, who enforces the law, must clearly underestimate the requirements of the law.
The rule of law also requires that the enforcer be given appropriate instructions as to when the law was breached. The philosophers of law call this the process value of law.
I am quoting examples of cities with VRY complex noise ordinances that emit vry sppcific noise levels allowed in all kinds of events, including a clause that noise in individual properties may not exceed ambient noise levels. Applying these ideas, Lamb says:
This law has less value for guidance, but has different excellent process values. A typical citizen does not own a decibel affel and does not know that the decibel scale is logarithmic to understand the difference between five decibels. A typical claimant probability cannot tell you where the offender’s property line is. However, police officers with decibel deposits can quickly show the offenders they receive the quote.
But it’s disbelief that Ram sees the most important driver in the first station’s law. This is part of the enforcer, leading to the demand for more complex and accurate rules.
Although it becomes distrustful, more rule makers turn rules into subsections and clause pages, hoping that Deviot citizens will look for loopholes and exceptions in the rules and predict them. The position of saying is aimed at the domest and the most injustice among us.
However, this demand is driven to a greater extent by the distrust of citizens towards the enforcer.
Similarly, the reason for the unbelieving citizens that the enforcers are tyrants is to use irrational exercise forces against them, unless the rules are prohibited. This is why citizens, not enforcers, tend to promote high process value rules. Considering the options, they refuse to accept tax laws subject to laws that give discretion to the clause “or similar cases” or interpretation.
This leads to the second law of the station.
The pressure that stirs discretion in rulemaking is much greater than the pressure that imparts it.
Lamb goes back to the “blank for ambiguity” about the Supreme Court doctrine dating back to 1926.
Whether the law is too vague depends on two tests. The first is whether a normal reasonable person can understand how to complicate the law in the Varyas situation. This is a guidance value test. Laws that are responsible for progressing inference should not be legislation. The second test is whether the law finds arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. This is a process value test. The law regarding books with no process value at all is to encourage, or at least approve, arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.
Distrust, which leads to more complicated rules, also leads to biases in favour of reconstructing the application of individual judgments into individual cases.
Distrust is the root of legalism. And the asymmetry between how easy it is to lose trust and how difficult it is to recover it explains why we march towards legalism and not leave. Distrust is a general explanation of Bush Namics’ Bush Law. It requires one famous case of Savabuban who exploited a loophole in the rules and escaped it and escaped it to legally change the Enten institution. Complex rules-making, fanatic compliance officers, and ambiguous bureaucrats need enthusiastic bureaucrats to enhance efficient or effective governance to suggest the need for reform.
Lam has received strong arguments in support of legalism in abstract terms, but in the real world the drive to legalism is the result of these outcomes and the result of these diffused laws.
Still, discretion has not disappeared from this world, and it cannot be done. In the next post, we will look at how LAM considers the use of discretion in one of the most controversial areas of this debate: law enforcement.
