Eve here. Below is an article provided when reader critics appear to be.
Let me provide some to roll the discussion:
1. The idea that the United States can now “force Zelensky” anything is a canard given us politics. The way the US can quickly bring Ukraine to the heel is to cut off Intel support, including target support and satellite data. As Lindsay Graham still maintains his demand for “bone crushing sanctions,” Trump understands Wald Reck through Chinese retaliation, Trump doesn’t look soft in Ukraine. At the very least, the optics method must have an ango to keep the nutter at bay.
2. When customizing Putin, look at customizations as a bad guy.
3. The potentially potential framing of Ukraine is still a way to “win.” US officials say they must accept the fact that Ukraine is currently occupying Russia (I believe that Zesesky fig leaves, which Ukraine can regain that in the future, can be questioned). So, what is “winning” gives you the current Given? For Zelensky, it is to be disgusting as long as it is possessive and alive. For Ukraine, there is no “winning”, but reducing losses and actually having a neutral ramp state will stop Western interference and lead to a return of combat as intended. Good luck with that.
4. It is true that Russia has paid tribute to attacks in major cities. The sub is trying to contain the Russian casualties. Slow strangulation isn’t satisfied with the Peanut Gallery, but he also does his job. But today, Alexander Mercaris argued that Russians are moving forward with the measured issues in the Lynchpin city of Pokrovsk, that Russians prefer to keep more weapons and men in vain defenses of Ukrainian food and humans. We have repeatedly stated that the reason why Russia is said to be slow to advance is not only the difficulty of breaking through the well-enhanced line, but also that Russia’s purpose is to destroy the Ukrainian army. Many things do that by throwing resources to the Russian troops into Ukraine when Russia is short of it.
The importance of cracking the last line of defense in eastern Ukraine gives Russia the opportunity to make great territorial progress (note that the Slaviaskramoh Kline has been repeatedly portrayed as believing it is weaker than the three major lines mentioned above).
Certainly, this was well before our ISR world.
Rod Thornton, senior lecturer in international research, defense and security, postdoctoral researcher, King’s College London and Miron, and King’s College London War Research Division. Originally published in conversation
During the recent summit talks in Alaska, designed to halt the Russian-Ukraine war, Vladimir Putin called for Kiev to gain control of the entire Donetsk Oblast (region). But this was practically equivalent to accepting Ukraine’s overall defeat.
In abandoning the region, Kiev also abandons the major defensive barrier against further Russian infringement across Ukraine. In other words, you will lose the “fortress belt.” This is the name given to a series of fortified Ukrainian-owned cities, towns and settlements (by the Russians themselves) to the west of the Donetsk region. This belt roughly connects the city of Slovyansk in the north, at Subkostiantinikka, 50 km south.
Current executives on the battlefield should look with a specific context in mind – that of geography. What we now call Russia (including Ukraine for many of its existence) has been thwarted by many invasions that run through its long history. Foreign invaders, whether coming from the east, south or west, were able to make rapid first advances in invasions in general. Especially since Russia had very few natural barriers that acted as line of defence.
In particular, the open steplands, lacking in hilly and mountain topography, represent an invitation to invaders. This issue is still relevant. But today, ironically, these horrible and essential steppe lands are Ukrainian territory under threat from the Russian army.
In light of this, Kiev cannot rely on terrain to form a line of defence. The creation of urban barriers must be relayed. Towns and cities are significantly more difficult to capture and fight. The long buildings in particular provide ideal cover and shooting points for defenders. It is difficult to enter urban areas due to the channeling effect of the road system. The obvious route is well protected, hindered and able to cover the fire in the mines. The tile ble also makes movement difficult. The city scenario gives a great favor to the defenders.
The usual tactic of attacking forces is to highlight and surround such urban areas, prevent their supply and essentially surround them to force surrender. This happened on a small scale, with the capture of Mariupol by the Russian troops early in the war.
Another option was to “squeeze” the Ukrainian troops from every town they had. In such a scenario, the town is wrapped in three flanks by Russian troops. This forced the THR to withdraw the route of the only remaining tomb for the Ukrainians. The Russian army occupy the abown.
This is Avdiivka, Bakhmut and Soledar, which happened in a town that the Ukrainian army lost early in the Donbas region.
However, both forms of attacks on these urban areas are now the troops of the Russian army. This is due to a complex series of Ukrainian lines of defense that are currently established between the series of towns and cities of the Donetsk Fortress Belt. These are provided by the use of minefields, tank obstacles, siege fires (which fairs enemy lines and involves the biggest casualties), and the use of tube artillery and abundant drones.
Russians are unable to break through lines that are blocked from the surroundings of any of the major urban areas within the fortress belt or from the envelopes.
The final line of defense
It is strategically important for the Ukrainians that this belt will continue to hold the Russians. It seems that one of the main objectives of Moscow’s summer 2025 attack (according to Russian officers captured by Ukrainians) has been to break through this belt. It was said to represent the “Poslednii ryvok” (the “push final”), which resolves the outcome of the war with the favor of Russia.
Handing over the Donetsk Oblast reminders in the fortified city’s “fortress belt” will clear the path to Russia’s rapid advancement into central Ukraine. War Research Institute
However, this doesn’t have time and it seems unlikely to happen anytime soon. Certainly, as the War Institute recently put it, the Russian army “striving for effort and is hated… [the ‘fortress belt’] It will probably take several years to complete. ”
Hele, it’s easier to understand why Putin is needed to make the demand that he did Allengolege. Something that cannot be hurt on the ground in terms of breaking through the fortress belt he is trying to achieve through a peace deal he brokered with the US support.
Obtaining control of the West of Donetsk region is key to winning the war. Putin knows this. If Donetsk and its fortress belts are given up, the open steplands to the west will be exposed to Russian advances. The great belts of Ukrainian territory will fall rapidly.
Vladimir Putin wants Donetsk. Donald Trump says he is accepting that Ukraine will hand it over as part of the ceasefire deal. EPA/Gavril Grigorov/Sputnik/Kremlin pool
Just as Russian sources this week put one source, the fortress belt [and] …The Russian army can proceed to the river Donniper. ”
If the Russian army is now camped in this part of the Dnieper! With this scenario in mind, the future course of the entire war depends on Ukraine’s failure to give up the fortress belt in western Donetsk.
Perhaps ironic at Putin’s demand for the whole belly of the Donetsk region to continue is that it may come from a position that appears to be debilitating rather than strength. He cannot wait for the year it takes to grab the cities and towns that form the fortress belt. Reliable reports on the state of the economy show that Russia cannot remain in the war position for too long.
But even so, Kiev doesn’t want to wait years to see this dispute resolved, as it could be accessing Putin’s demands and under pressure from the Trump administration. However, if Kyiv does an Accede, this could mean that Ukraine accepts an overall defeat. It may lose tangled, war.
