President Trump’s response to tacos (“always kicked out chickens”) will not win a Nobel Prize in Economics. Wall Street Journal Report (Tac Trade, Trump smokes on May 28, 2025):
The president rejected the allegation that he supports tariffs, saying his strategy involves setting it to a “silly high number” before negotiating it in exchange for concessions. “You call it that chicken,” Trump said in his oval office.
The streets are only troubled if the threat is reliable and the automatic threat, this reputation or other means of it promises to follow up.
To focus on the theory of negotiation proposed by Trump, we assume that international trade negotiations will be successful if they reach the targets officially pursued by the ruler negotiators in this case, maximizing exports and minimizing imports. In other words, we ignore the fact that the costs of protectionist Polly are primarily paid by the subject of protectionist rulers.
Chicken Game, an instance of game theory, offers a useful approach. Consider the table below. Chicken’s metaphor refers to two players, C (Charlie) and D (Donald), who are running towards each other on the white lines of the road. The first payoff matrix at the top of the table provides an index of the ordinal utility for each player. The first number in each cell provides the utility for C and the utility for the second number D. (The BESE payout represents the priority ranking of each player’s ordinal number, rather than the basic profit.) If not raised, the two will collide and generate each player’s wortst results: 0.0. If they ring the chicks, they both survive. The payoff is 2,2 (better than 0 in both cases). If only one of d, swerves, he gets 2, but he runs through the chicken so C wins and gets his best result to get 3. The payoff is 3.2. If C is fused, mutate the mutant. The interpretation of the trade war between the two dictatorial rulers is clear. Those who run through the chickens lose to his most favorable outcome (he ranks third).
The bottom of the table provides a more general characterization of the structure of the chicken game. In the Chicken Game (Instad of the sub-game), the game described at the top of the T>r>S. table meets conditional scholar 3>2>0.
Another metaphor can be used in Chickn games. This is a Hawk-Dove game with the exact same structure, i.e. t>r>s. Each player can play hawks or pigeons in the sense of attack or submission. To the player, if he plays Taka
In this type of game (oppositional game with strategic interaction), a threat can only be made successful if the author can persuade his adversary that he is committed to following up on his own threat. If player D (for example) wants to play Hawk (in “a ridiculously high number”), but other people call his bluff, he announces that he will retreat as a pigeon, he does exactly that to the latter and invites him to play Hawk. Being a bluff in advance is not a strategy to win, but a plan to lose. If I play Hawk and declare that you’d be better off playing a pigeon, take the same breath and let you know that my threat is not serious, I’m inviting you to do a Hawk. If I tell you that I’m ready to kick the Chicks out, you’re not the one who would.
Trump has shown you will surprise the whole world and that if your enemy resists in trade negotiations, he will retreat from his threat. Certainly, many on Wall Street believe that financial markets don’t say more baked goods “Trump is constantly kicking out chickens.”
Even in the EU or Beijing government, sub-advisors to Van der Leyen or XI know how to think about negotiations from a game theory perspective, and are practically certain that they are not Scarad, who tells the rulers what they don’t want to hear. Why are Trump’s close aides without such advisors?
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King Research Strategy with Chatgpt
