Book Review of Democracy for Busy People, by Kevin J. Elliott.
Kevin J. Elliott’s 2023 book, Democracy for Busy People, is a must-read for anyone interested in liberal democratic politics. This book is of particular value to classical liberals because it deals with topics often ignored by commentators of classical liberal democracy and takes opportunity costs seriously into account.
The introduction begins by explaining “busyness” and its relationship to democratic politics. In Part 1, Elliott argues for a realistic minimum level of democratic participation. The second part discusses institutional reforms towards a more inclusive democracy.
Being busy for Elliott isn’t limited to the demands of a strong career that only bother some people. It affects everyone. Marginalized groups are busy overcoming discrimination. Immigrants are busy establishing social networks. People are busy with caregiving, work, commuting, housework, maintaining and managing relationships, having hobbies, and maintaining health and happiness. Busyness affects the time and effort people spend on politics. It does not and should not affect the extent to which people are entitled to democratic equality.
There is more to life than politics. That should be important for politics.
Inequalities in busyness cannot be eliminated. Even in a world of abundance, some people may choose to care for their family members themselves rather than (for example) sharing the work with a professional caregiver. This choice reduces time spent on politics, just as it reduces time spent on other pursuits.
Whether a liberal democracy is truly democratic depends on its ability to include all voices. When people are too busy with politics, their voices don’t get heard.
What does democracy require?
Elliott believes that citizen participation is necessary for democracy to function. He argues that we have a right to other priorities. There, he argued that while people have a duty to participate in democracy, they also have the right to demand a minimum level of citizenship. (p.83-84)
Although demandingness is an ongoing concern in democratic theory (Elliott provides a useful summary of related work), it is also an old one. Benjamin Constant’s “Freedom of the Ancients” Compare it to the freedom of modern people who were worried about it two centuries ago.
Mr. Constant points out that the modern concerns of “the enjoyment of peace and individual independence” are in contrast to the ancient (Greek and Roman) concerns of freedom as participation in governance, that is, “active and continuous participation in collective power.” said that they were competing for thought, time, and attention. ” He feared that modern man might be tempted to abandon the task of governing himself and hand over that task to dictators.
In this book, Eliot is more concerned about the ‘activists of the aristocracy’ (p94) than the contemporary Napoleon. Activists have the time, resources, and interest to make politics a big part of their lives. People who dedicate their lives to politics are not representative of the average person, and certainly not of those who are too busy with politics.
People with such an abundance of time, resources, and interest are among the most enthusiastic about democratic reform, which places greater demands on democratic participation.
“The opportunity cost of political participation should be lowered to make it easier to fulfill the obligations of liberal democracy.”
Less demanding democracy addresses Eliot’s current concerns and Constant’s earlier concerns. The opportunity cost of political participation should be lowered to make it easier to fulfill the obligations of liberal democracy. It can also increase the relative influence of the average citizen.
Elliott rejects the claim that democracy simply requires obeying the law. (p 17) But he also denies requiring people to take on special duties (national service) or professional roles (activist or journalist). The model of democratic citizenship proposed by Elliott is based on lower bounds on what is necessary and possible for ordinary citizens. Rather than trying to get everyone to participate at a high level, he aims to raise the democratic participation of the least-participated citizens to a minimum level.
Elliott calls his minimum standard “standby citizenship,” which consists of three parts. (p. 100) Voters must (1) pay critical attention to politics and (2) have the “civic skills” necessary to participate. Attentiveness and civic skills enable waiting citizens to practice (3) “upward flexibility,” that is, increasing engagement when needed;
Citizenship for busy people
Critical attention means that the public needs to be aware of the main issues and actors in politics. This awareness is necessary to build civic skills and increase participation where appropriate. (p.100)
Elliott is concerned about a politically “unsocialized” population who don’t know what’s going on or how to get involved. The lack of political socialization is not just a personal failure for Elliott. He argues that an unsocialized population creates externalities. They are sensitive to undemocratic arguments that downplay the benefits of democracy or make promises that democratic institutions cannot fulfill. The politically unsocialized population is most at risk of supporting the Bonapartist despot of Constant. In addition, they cannot avoid recognizing, responding to, and participating in injustices in their communities.
Elliott acknowledges that citizens can ethically decide not to participate in politics. But he requires them to make that decision critically, which requires at least some caution.
Elliott’s civic skills are knowing when and how to vote and understanding democratic institutions and what they can (or cannot) accomplish. These skills reduce future participation costs and prepare citizens. They also help inoculate the population against demagogy.
Nonparticipation does not exempt citizens from the need for civic skills. Without civic skills, people who decide to opt out of politics may be “swamped by reality” (p. 113) and become less involved in politics if they realize that political action is needed. You will not be ready to strengthen.
“Upward flexibility” becomes important when the public realizes that something requires more action than usual. This may be the case when there is a real crisis in democracy or when the problem is too pressing to ignore. It takes great care to realize that more work is needed. You need civic skills to do the job.
Upward flexibility is essential to soften the demands of democracy. This allows citizens to “stand back” during normal times and pay attention to political issues and political cycles without constantly devoting time and attention to politics, which a crisis requires.
Focus on inclusive systems
Elliott is interested in how educational institutions encourage (or discourage) elective citizenship. The second part of his book considers the costs and benefits of different institutional designs with busyness in mind. This is of value to anyone who takes to heart Constant’s concerns about modern citizens’ neglect of participation in governance.
Elliott introduces a topic called the “paradox of empowerment” at the beginning of the book. (p. 6) This is best illustrated by the following example. Democratic supporters concerned about the lack of participation are trying to fix the problem by introducing more opportunities for participation, such as mini-rallies inviting the public to debate difficult issues. Local government meetings, or more direct political voting.
The theory behind these new institutions is that they create new avenues for entering politics. But unless barriers to participation are also lowered, the same people who are too busy to participate in existing democratic institutions will remain too busy. These new avenues of participation will therefore be dominated by those already participating, strengthening their influence over the democratic system.
Instead of adding more institutions, Elliott advocates for institutions that “make participation cheap and easy, and politics understandable.”
Elliott focuses on elections, which can explain how he thinks about institutions. Elections are a nearly universal political experience. Because almost everyone participates (even just in discussion), it tends to involve a period of shared social consciousness, where people come to grips with the situation through normal social interactions, literal political socialization. It will be easier.
Elections are a time when activists not only pursue special interests but also provide a general public service by educating other voters about when, where, and how to vote. Activists can also lower the cost of voting, for example by providing transportation to and from polling stations.
During elections, political parties and candidates are sometimes encouraged from a self-interested perspective to inform voters about what they will do if elected. You can also check the other party’s claims and promises. This way you can communicate information to your voters.
This is what elections can do. However, this is not always the case, and in fact it is often not the case. Elliott details how non-competitive elections force parties and candidates to speak only to their own base and even try to demobilize the opposition. Election procedures that make it difficult to register and vote can also drive out busy people.
One thing elections always do is give equal influence in making final decisions. That’s 1 vote. One person, one vote equalizes political participation in a way that more intensive democratic reforms cannot. No matter what else you say about elections, this advantage remains.
Not all of the reforms Mr. Elliott proposes will please classical liberals. To take one example, we disagree on the empirical evidence and legality of compulsory voting even when opting out is cheap and easy (as Elliott proposes).
For more information on these topics, see:
But such disagreements are more satisfying than the democratic debates that have often been felt in classical liberal circles. Too often we stop at points where democracy is less than perfect and fail to drive home the point. This has led some to conclude that classical liberals as a bloc are opposed to democracy, even though many of us are not.
Eliot’s interest in improving democracy should attract the attention of classical liberals interested in Constant’s modern freedom, democratic peace, inclusion, and equality. Aiming for perfection is not an option, but improvement may be possible.
footnote
[1] Kevin Elliott (2023). Democracy for busy people. University of Chicago Press, 2023.
[2] A Comparison of the Liberty of the Ancients and the Liberty of the Moderns (1819) by Benjamin Constant. Liberty Online Library.
[3] Elliott, pp. 54-57. Justified apathy can be reflective (deliberate), or it can be a temporary and beneficial disengagement from politics. In any case, it is incompatible with complete indifference to politics.
[4] This phrase is not from Elliott’s book, but it is a book lecture that can be found here: RGCS Lecture: Kevin Elliott (Yale University), “Democracy for Busy People.” March 14, 2024. YouTube.
[5] Elliott believes that institutions that encourage participation (mandatory voting, easy voter registration, flexible voting times, predictable election dates), make politics understandable (clear lines of responsibility, political parties), and that encourage competition Discuss systems that increase power (proportional representation, access to public voting). Elliott’s reasoning in each case provides evidence and arguments that classical liberals who are not democratic theorists may not be aware of.
*Janet Bufton is an education consultant and copy editor in Ottawa, Ontario, primarily working on projects involving Adam Smith, trade and regulatory policy, Indigenous peoples, and labor market economics.
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