Eve here. Popular American myths impose taxes without representation as the driving force behind America’s reincarnation against England. This article argues that, without consent, non-XE is particularly obscure, as the central part of the French Revolution. Trump’s tariffs are children of arbitrary tax posters that are blocked without citizens or legislative approval. And the level of inequality in the United States is higher than that of pre-revolutionary France.
Tommaso Giommoni, Gabriel Loumeau, Marco Tabellini. Originally published on Voxeu
We believe that extractive taxation is one of the main causes of the French Revolution. This column took advantage of the French salt tax variation on 22% of the Royal Rivers in 1780, documenting the French region where more tax rates experienced more rebellion in the years leading up to the revolution. These effects were amplified by drugs that stimulated food prices and potential dissatisfaction. It suggests that taxation can potentially catalyze general anxiety if thrusts without expression, especially after negative economic shocks.
The French Revolution delved into ancient regimes, led a new political order, and redefine the power and institutions of the state. The transformation shapes institutions around the world, from the abolition of feudal privileges to the creation of modern bureaucratic and legal frameworks that go far beyond France. The cause of the French Revolution is complex and multifaceted, but one of the factors that are widely collected is extractive taxation (Norberg 1994). However, to our knowledge, what is evident is that there is no systematic evidence for the hypothesis that the extracted fiscal institutions are important salient in the French Revolution.
Our recent paper (Giommoni etal. 2025) seeks to fill this gap and exploit geographical variation in the salt tax incident. The first temporary measures were introduced in the mid-13th century and permanently created a century later, and the salt tax in 1780 accumulated in 22% of the royal revival (Touzery 2024). Salt taxes vary across regions along the boundaries of multiple taxes, creating large tax rate discontinuities that can be explained in analysis. The provision of bekose public goods was minimal, and those centered on royal privileges such as national defense and justice did not accommodate higher redistribution.
Data on all historic salt tax boundaries from the Digital Archives of the National Library of France were obtained and localized. This was a reciprocal investigation with newly collected information on the salt tax rates prevailing in each jurisdiction on the eve of the French Revolution. The resulting map is plotted in Figure 1 (dark shades of blue corresponding to higher salt tax rates). Tohese data is combined with a comprehensive dataset assembled by Chambru (2019), which provides detailed locations for uprising events before, during and after Frent Revolution.
Figure 1 Salt tax map
Note: This diagram plots the salt tax and expresses the salt tax in pounds per liter, along with highlights of the orange salt tax boundary.
Calonico et al. (2014) Around the border of salt tax. Crossing the salt tax boundary reveals a discontinuous increase in the number of riots (Figure 2, Panel A). The impact of the salt tax began to appeal in the 1760s, peaked in the 1780s, and grew over time (Figure 2, Panel B). Our estimates show that crossing borders from these low effects is due to intentional margins (more riots in a particular location) and more places that experience at least one riot).
Figure 2 Riots around the tax boundary
a) Number of riots, 1750-1789
Note: Plots are Callonico et al. (2014) Under the selection of optimal bandwidth and polynomial order. Variation dependence is the number of economic and political uprisings between 1750 and 1789. This treatment is equal for a higher proportion of local municipalities. Specifications include boundary fixed effects and a set of local government controls (population, coordinates, and soil fertility in 1780). The sample includes all neighboring French municipalities, except for the lower quartile Tose in the tax gap distribution. The coefficient is 0.104 and the standard error clustered at the bailliage level is 0.045.
b) Estimating regression and continuity, by 10 years
Note: Plots are Callonico et al. (2014) Under the selection of optimal bandwidth and polynomial order. Variable dependence is the number of economic and political uprisings over different periods (10 years bins). This treatment equals a higher proportion of local municipalities. Specifications include boundary fixed effects and a set of local government controls (population, coordinates, and soil fertility in 1780). The sample includes all neighboring French municipalities, except for the lower quartile Tose in the tax gap distribution. Standard ERRs are clustered at the Bailliage level.
Salt taxes have been in place for centuries. Why has it been reduced since 1780? History has settled on serious structural factors, such as the widening of Enlight’s ideas and the improvisation rate of the French government’s rise. Historians and economists also highlight that a series of torts that struck France in the 1780s destroyed the harvest, raised the prices of wheat, and the Bellows rebellion ran through the country (Lefebvre et al. 1947, Waldinger 2024).
We speculate that the eruption of grievance has become stronger in places where the weather is historically burdened by a higher salt tax that stimulates citizens’ frustration and opposition to the state. Combining the baseline key obligation analysis with temporal and spatial variation in temperature during growth seasons confirms this hypothesis and shows that droucks amplifies the effects of salt tax on rebellions.
We link analysis directly to the French Revolution. First, we test whether the salt tax has taken away the universe and the spread of rebellion over time. We focus on the waves of riots that shake France right after the Bastille story, also known as the great fear. Rumors were that between mid-July and early August 1789, the king called for rumors that he caused a third estate, causing panic, leading to the abolition of feudal privilege on August 4, 1789 (Lefebbre 1973). Using newly georeferenced data, we document that high-tax areas are likely to host the first rebellion, and many other riots are likely to follow. It also shows that rebellion will propagate more in high tax territory amidst the great fear.
Next, we confirm that the portion borne by the higher salt tax in France, in the list of greevances collected by the king in the spring of 1789, representing more complaints about the salt tax prior to the general estate (Shapiro etal. 1998). It also collects data from newly elected members of the Parliament (Parliament of the Kingdom of France from October 1, 1791 to September 20, 1792) and documents that lawmakers representing areas subject to higher salt taxes are likely to support the abolition of the monarchy.
Using newly excavated data on the votes cast in January 1793 by members of the Convention National, we further document the likelihood that legislators arising from one high tax area will vote for the King’s death penalty. Comparing two lawmakers representing high and low tax areas, respectively, the former is 50 percantate points (or 79.5% compared to the average), making them more likely to vote for the King’s death penalty than the latter.
The concept that extractive taxation was one of the main cousins of the French Revolution is widely collected in historical literature (Marion 1921, Sands 1949, Tauzery 2024). However, our paper was the first to provide systematic evidence in support of this idea. More broadly, our findings shed light on the relationship between taxes and revolution, resonating with the well-known saying, “No Taxation without Representative.” Angelucci et al. (2022) enable financial autonomy and local collection to represent medieval British towns. Our findings highlight the risks of political exclusion. If taxation is thrust without expression, it can assume the popular Arrest and the catalyst for regime change, particularly negative economic shocks.
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