The escalating debate over a possible US bombing campaign against Iran is based on the well-known premise that sufficient military bombing can achieve decisive political results. This article argues that bombing Iran is strategically unsound not just because it is unlikely to bring down the Iranian regime, but because even the most extreme hypothetical “success” would not secure Israel’s future. The Middle East is not a two-man system. Without a clear political end goal, including a permanent peace treaty with its neighbors, the Israeli military becomes a substitute for strategy, and every apparent success merely resets the system for the next round of combat. The folly of bombing Iran is therefore nested within the larger folly of seeking security through endless regional conflicts without political closure.
Policy concessions vs. regime collapse
Strategic discussions often conflate two fundamentally different conflict outcomes. Policy concessions are limited and often reversible adjustments are made under pressure. In contrast, regime collapse involves the destruction of leadership cohesion and the loss of a monopoly on organizational power. These outcomes are controlled by different mechanisms and should not be confused. Although air power has occasionally succeeded in extracting concessions, its track record in causing regime collapse is poor and inconsistent. Treating concessions as evidence of collapse is a mistake that inflates expectations, obscures failures, and encourages repeated escalation.
What the historical record of air power effectiveness shows
A consistent pattern emerges across various instances of extreme air force military punishment. That is, destruction accumulates without a corresponding erosion of political authority. Regimes fail not when cities and infrastructure are destroyed from the air, but when the control of force changes on the ground, or when elites defect en masse. The best example of this pattern is:
Germany (World War II)
Germany experienced the longest and most comprehensive industrial bombing campaign in history. Allied air forces systematically targeted industrial centers, transportation networks, and urban populations. The suffering of civilians was immeasurable. Entire cities were destroyed and industrial capacity was severely reduced. However, the Nazi regime maintained its authority, administrative consistency, and coercive control until Allied ground forces crossed Germany’s borders and occupied German territory.
The decisive factor in Germany’s collapse was not the destruction from the air, but the physical elimination of the regime’s military monopoly. Although the bombing weakened Germany’s fighting ability, it did not destroy elite cohesion or cause internal subversion. Authority broke down only when ground invasions made continued control impossible. The lesson is stark: the capabilities of air power, not the rules, have declined.
Dresden, 1945 – the city once called Florence on the Elbe River
North Korea (Korean War)
North Korea suffered almost complete destruction during the Korean War. Major cities were destroyed, infrastructure destroyed, and civilian casualties were severe. If complete destruction were enough to bring down a regime, North Korea would have been a prime candidate. Instead, the regime survived and strengthened. External attacks became the central narrative justifying a perpetually besieged state. The experience of devastation strengthened political control and justified extreme domestic repression. Rather than collapse, the regime became more durable and ideologically entrenched. Extreme punishments did not undermine authority. That was the basis for it.
Wonsan, North Korea, attacked by B-26 bombers, 1951
Vietnam
The U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam was long, intense, and technologically sophisticated. These were clearly designed to force political compliance, tear the resolve of leaders, and raise the costs of resistance beyond what could be endured. These goals were not achieved. The unity of the leadership remained intact, popular resistance was maintained, and the legitimacy of the revolution was strengthened. The bombing legitimized the regime’s narrative of national resistance and foreign invasion. The Vietnam incident shows a repeating pattern. Air punishment often strengthens the unity and ideological resolve of elites in revolutionary and nationalist regimes.
Cam Tien Street in central Hanoi was bombed by the US military in December 1972.
Gaza (modern day)
The devastation in Gaza illustrates the same logic in recent events. Despite extraordinary levels of urban destruction, civilian suffering, and loss of life, Hamas has not collapsed, either as a ruler or a military force. Its coercive power has been reduced, but not eliminated. Its internal legitimacy among its core constituency persists. The Gaza incident underscores the important point that even extreme destruction does not automatically lead to political collapse. Organizations organized for siege and resistance can withstand a level of punishment that outside observers assume is decisive.
Aftermath of an Israeli airstrike in the area around the Hassan el-Banna Mosque in the Gaza Strip, 2025
Refutation of standard counterexamples
Advocates of coercive air power frequently cite two examples to argue that bombing can bring down regimes. The most common are Serbia (1999) and Libya (2011). Neither supports that claim.
Serbia (1999): Concession, not collapse.
The NATO air campaign against Serbia is often cited as evidence that air power can force decisive political outcomes. In reality, the campaign did not result in the collapse of the regime, but instead elicited political concessions such as the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. Slobodan Milosevic remained in power for more than a year after the bombing ended. The regime only collapsed after electoral defeat, mass protests, and defections from elites within the security services. The decisive mechanism was internal political dynamics, not air punishment. Treating Serbia as an event of regime collapse commits the categorical error of confusing territorial concessions with political collapse. Moreover, Serbia was politically weak in ways that differed from Iran, including a fragmented elite, weak ideological legitimacy, and limited depth of domestic coercion. Serbia shows the limits of air power, not its decisiveness.
Libya (2011): Air power as an enabler of civil war
Libya is frequently misrepresented as a case of regime collapse due to bombing. In fact, the Libyan regime collapsed because air power made ground warfare possible. NATO strikes destroyed Loyalist armor, provided intelligence and targeting, and served as de facto close air support for rebel forces that captured territory and eliminated the regime’s military monopoly. This was not a forced collapse from the air. It was an outside intervention that caused a civil war. Libya’s institutions were thin, the elite was divided, and armed groups already existed in the country. None of these conditions apply in Iran. Libya thus demonstrates that regimes fail not when bombs fail, but when organized ground forces take control.
Token Concession and Story End
A limited military strike could generate claims of success. Token concessions, whether real, vague, or rhetorically contrived, provide face-saving closure without changing the underlying power structure of the enemy. Leaders can declare victory, restore narrative deterrence, and end escalation without achieving a strategic solution. Such an outcome would be politically expedient and strategically empty. They reward the illusion that force has solved problems that have simply been postponed and encourage repetition rather than reassessment. Similar dynamics have emerged in recent U.S. operations in Latin America, where narrative frames emphasize short-term tactical gains while leaving underlying political and strategic dilemmas intact.
Iranian complex rebellion fantasy
Some supporters of the bombing imagine that Iranian airstrikes would be amplified by simultaneous domestic uprisings of Kurds, Baluchs, and Azerbaijanis. This scenario is not believable. These groups lack heavy weapons, formal military organization, unified command, logistics, and the ability to occupy and hold territory. Complaints are no substitute for force. Without an organized ground force capable of withstanding counterattacks, local unrest cannot become a decisive factor. Hoping otherwise is wishful thinking, not strategy.
Even maximum “success” cannot secure Israel.
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that a major attack on Iran could collapse the regime and permanently neutralize Iran as a threat. Even this extreme hypothesis does not guarantee Israel’s future. The Middle East is not a two-man system. Iran is not the only state with significant influence in Israel’s strategic environment. Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, other Gulf states, and Pakistan will remain, each with their own interests, capabilities, domestic dynamics, and potential points of friction. Israel cannot bomb areas without other powers, rivalries, or future enemies. Without a politically defined final state, including permanent border definitions and a durable peace treaty, military action cannot permanently establish Israel’s security. It can only be managed temporarily.
conclusion
Bombing Iran is foolish not just because it is unlikely to achieve its stated objectives. This is a misguided move embedded in a deeper policy failure: the lack of a clear political end-state capable of delivering regional security. Even with maximum coercive success against Iran, Israel’s long-term strategic problems will remain unresolved. Although military superiority reduces Israel’s immediate danger, it does not eliminate its exposure to long-term danger. A strategy predicated on endless armed conflict with an unattainable end state is no strategy at all. It is a perpetual cycle of war where cumulative risk guarantees failure.
