In the central US, there are 400 nuclear missile silos, which are land components of US nuclear decisions. The silo’s Minuteman III missile is about 50 years old. They have been upgraded repeatedly over the years, but the Air Force has decided that it would need to develop alternatives. The Sentinel, a new missile under development, has been transformed into a classic case of an inappropriate weapons program.
Minuteman missile in the silo – Time to retire?
The first concept of the Sentinel missile program was to directly replace the Minuteman III missiles in existing launch silos. By reusing the silos, the project was competitive with Minuteman’s alternative life-extension alternative or switch to the concept of mobile missiles. Initially they competed in the competition for Boeing and North Upgrading Grumman’s contracts, but Boeing withdrew in 2019, with Northrop becoming the sole bidder. The expected costs began to rise sharply at this point, and in January 2024, the Air Force notified Congress that it had made a baseline forecast with costs of the Sentinel program more than 25% apart. This violation mandated a formal review and certification process to determine whether the program should continue.
In July 2024, the Department of Defense completed its Nunn-McCurdy review. The Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Retention has identified the Sentinel programme as meeting the criteria required to advance. However, it ended approval of Milestone B of the program and directed a reorganization to address cost overruns and management issues. It remains to be seen whether Northrup Grumman will make any major changes to reduce the cost of the program.
Dig with dollars
The most notable development in the process of Runa cost-cost mass of Sentinel missiles is the recent decision to build new silos rather than reuse the existing ones. In May 2025, the US Air Force announced that the Sentinel ICBM program would require the construction of an entirely new missile silo, adding billions of dollars to the project’s costs. The decision comes after the improved ratings have been made that the Submarine III silos, which approach 100 years ago by the end of Sentinel’s Experience Services life, were unable to properly add them due to the new missile. Factors such as structural degradation and the need for extensive modernization were the basis for the decision that building new silos would be more practical and cost-effective than modifying the old ones.
Minuteman Silo Complex – Is it too difficult to fix?
It is confusing to say the least to say the least that “structural degradation” occurred in reinforced concrete structures designed to withstand near misses by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the notion that modern fiber optic link control infrastructure cannot be renutried with structures that house much larger analog calls and older electronic systems is highly questionable. Furthermore, there is something fundamental about generating silo structures. Modern nuclear missiles are precise sculptures for destroying the most robustly restrained silos. The accuracy of the ICBM is within 30-50 meters of the target. There is no viable silo design that can survive close hits (within 100-200 meters) with warheads that promote modern Earth. This will aim to improve the curing of existing silos meaninglessly. The survival rate of missile silos is now a myth that has been realized as institutional inertia and incentives for defense contracts.
Location of Minuteman Missile Site
Nuclear difficult mischievous magic
Perhaps the greatest boon awarded to the defense industry by nuclear was the elusive concept of deterrence. Like Schrodinger’s cat, it exists simultaneously in two contradictory states. It’s always important, but insufficient for many years. Its supporters argue that while sparing the nuclear attack, they are maintaining and maintaining us as an immediate risk of losing our deterrent, unless we spend a large sum of money to preserve it. The magical property of boredom means there is no loose connection between the money spent on boredom and the boring amounts that correspondents have secured. This is a deterrence of Scholause, which is unknown to psychology and exists in the minds of potential attackers. However, deterrence is considered to be extremely important and serves as a major justification for the new nuclear weapons program. Detrell’s claim that you have a rich fountain for strategic nuclear weapon manufacturers.
Magical thoughts about Demence are abundantly displayed in the suspicious design decisions of the Sentinel missile program. Originally intended to simply replace the aging Minuteman III land-based missiles, Sentinel has been transformed into a runaway weapons program at a cost that is expected to far outweigh the initial estimates. Supporters of the Sentinel program evoke the magic of boredom as justification for all the expensive features added to the missile. Why do we need to go over $100 billion more when they claim that bigger payloads, longer ranges, and more surviving silos are all added to the boredom?
Development risks and development gifts
If the goal is a quantum leap in capabilities, there is a legitimate argument to embrace the risks of weapon development. Development of stealth fighter jets that provide a measurable military advantage over potential enemies, and therefore overrunning costs and schedules for these programs can help keep your degree down. However, the Sentinel program, like some other false US weapons programs, does not offer any important new capabilities, and offers suspicious “improvements” at the cost of Fat Enormus. Defense contractors, military leaders and politicians all have incentives to overstate the value of such programs and to keep their costs modest, knowing that they once launched momentum for a big arms project. This problem does not end with weapon development. A gift that continues to give is a lifelong cost and the cost of supporting its operating weapon system. This cost is also chronically underestimated, with the main beneficiary being once again the defense contractor. There is reason to believe that Sentinel follows this pattern and has a current estimate of over $25-300 billion.
Conclusion
The Sentinel missile program is another mismanaged US weapons program that shows the chronic flaws of procurement systems that have failed to incentivise evil vendors and oversee government oversight. The Secretary of Defense will need to change the immediate orders to the Sentinel missile program to use the current Minuteman launch infrastructure, while minimizing necessary changes to existing facilities. Since silos cannot withstand attacks by modern ICBMS, building new silos has been heavily infected with the cost of the program, with little added working capacity. The current Secretary of Defense’s willingness to make changes will be a test of the Trump administration’s series in eliminating waste in government operations. If the Department of Defense does not act to keep costs down for this program, Congress will need to continue funding to implement a sound design approach based on independent reviews by experts other than the Pentagon and contractor impact. Northrup Grumman needs to listen to sub-common-sense advice. If you find yourself in the hole, stop digging it.
