Theodore Postle is an expert in withdrawal MIT physics, which was to be consulted with the Pentagon on nuclear weapons and missile defense. I recently published a presentation on Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities, which I have compiled in a YouTube interview. Professor Postol explains in quite a bit of detail how the construction of a labor nucleus works with Iran’s capabilities. His full presentation.pdf is available here. Indicates sub of the key slide. Strangely, this information has not been reported in the mass media. We’ll explain why this is a big story and why it’s been supported.
How can they foam bombs?
Iran needs three things to create operational nuclear weapons.
1. Skin materials
Using information collected by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), which monitors Iran’s nuclear activity, Professor Postul gives birth to our chain of reasoning, starting with the current stockpile of the current 60% enriched U235, and the creation of a bomb-grade U235 ends with multiple fiction bombs. There is no evidence that 60% of the concentrated material was destroyed during recent attacks by Israel and the US. The Iranian Urd is highly motivated to safely store this small amount of material.
Postol July 24, 2025 Presentation page 2
An important point of this presentation is that Iran’s existing stockpile of 60% enriched U235s in Iran will fit into small commercial buildings.
2. Compact bomb design
It creates the simplest design of the nuclear bomb U235 and the critical mass by VRY that quickly binds to the subcritical port of skin material by explosive means. This was the way the US used in the atomic bomb that it dropped on Hiroshima. The physics that determine the outcome is sotrashtforward, which is not a test. The explosive yield of this type of missile-deliveryable basic warhead is relatively low (10-20 kilotons) compared to plutonium fiction or thermonuclear weapons, but it is sufficient to destroy it in the city.
Postol July 24, 2025 Presentation page 27
July 24, 2025 Presentation page 28
Postol July 24, 2025 Presentation page 30
The estimated explosive yield of the bomb design, 7-20 kilotons, described by Professor Postul, is roughly equivalent to the destructive force (15 kilotons) of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. At the time, Hiroshima’s population (350.00) was roughly the same size as the current Haifa (290.00).
3. Effective delivery system
Iran is posting multiple missile systems that can draw Sedil-2, Khybersikan, Fatta and Dezful on a 100 kg payload from Iran to Israel. All of these allow for nuclear warhead delivery and have additional payload capacity for the decoy to counter interceptor missiles. The pilot and polar designs (e.g. Khaybar Shekan and Fattah) further complicate Israel’s defenses.
Strategic Inania Bomb
The main value of Iran, which must have nuclear weapons capabilities, is determined. Israel is no longer able to lead Iran with complete destruction through nuclear attacks and full-scale US invasions. Even nuclear missiles could destroy Israel completely and inflict unacceptable casualties on US troops in the region.
Israel needs to be responsible for sophisticated civil defense systems directed at the threat of traditional chemical missiles, but there is a lack of infrastructure to protect the general population from radiation radiation after a nuclear attack. There is no limited radiation curing shelters, no large-scale fallout protection for urban populations, and no publicly available national radiation response systems. Israel’s nuclear defense strategy leans heavily towards difficulties and interception, rather than protecting the population in the aftermath of the nuclear weapons.
A 10-kiloton nuclear explosion through Tel Aviv can cause up to 100,000 deaths and 500,000 casualties, but a strike against Highfakul will result in 40,000-70,000 deaths and more than 300,000 injuries, especially if the industrial zone is hit. These are conservative estimates. Current numbers could be higher depending on the details of the explosion and emergency response capabilities. Economic, environmental and geopolitical subsidies are devastating. Israel’s nuclear strike against Iran is equally frightening.
The possibility of an Iranian nuclear strike negates Israel’s traditional missile defense doctrine, with only intercepted missiles predicted to attack populated areas or critical infrastructure. This selective engagement saves interceptor resources during traditional attacks, but is irrelevant when faced with potential nuclear threats. Even low-yield nuclear explosions cause widespread destruction, including blast damage, heat radiation, EMP, and falloutfa, beyond one impact point, pose a strategic threat to missiles estrange the national space. In this context, incoming ballistic missiles must be treated as rigidity in potentially nuclear-armed predicted travectories. This requires full engagement of all targets, and is difficult for whetherher to appeal to threading a particular structure. As a result, even representative or suspected nuclear warheads dramatically increases the burden on missile defense systems and undermines defense strategies based on perset risk triage.
Iran is likely to refuse to declare possession of nuclear weapons, following Israeli examples. This will protect Somowhat from criticism, but Augh information may be leaked or discovered to make its nuclear capabilities reliable. It is sad irony that the preventive nuclear weapons “deteriorating military action against the development of nuclear weapons may have ultimately convinced them that such development was necessary.
The silence of the lamb
The lack of commentary on Professor Postul’s mainstream averages regarding the declaration of Iranian capabilities could be expiring primarily by the central ti-sickness of today’s masses. Reporting this story would make Trump’s declaration of ending Iran’s nuclear program seem stupid. The call triggers punitive actions by the Trump administration on the business interests of media owners. Editors and journalists can hide political fear by the declaration that the Postul’s claims have not been confirmed by the US intelligence news community, the same community that spins like politically-style weather traces, and have been affirming, denying and denying Iran’s nuclear weapons programme for years.
Conclusion
Based on Professor Postol’s argument, it is highly likely that Iranian Eisa already has a fulfilling nuclear weapon or that it will be able to produce it in the near future. This development means a dead end in Israel’s strategy to remove Iran from regional enemies. Israel cannot persuade the US to invade nuclear-armed Iran, and Israel will not pass Iran on a nuclear strike without fear of nuclear retaliation. The false mirorism foreign policy of Israel and the US is another example of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and could continue further as long as the country continues to use military force as a major geopolitical tool. If Israel and the United States continue to live with swords, they will find a nuclear sword appearing in the hands of other countries.
