For more than a century, the United States has projected power overseas through its naval presence. Once upon a time, a cruiser anchored offshore was enough to send a message: “Comply or face the consequences.” The strategy of gunboat diplomacy was based on overwhelming naval superiority, rapid deployment, and the expectation that smaller states would have no means of resistance.
But times have changed. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) were conceived in the early 2000s as a means of sophisticated, high-speed military power in contested coastal waters, but have now been quietly retired. The failure is more than just a procurement debacle. This marked the end of the era when the U.S. Navy could sail close to the coasts of other countries and expect obedience rather than defiance. This article discusses the convergent failure of LCS programs and the related concept of coercive diplomacy.
Misunderstood mission solution
The LCS was intended to fill the perceived operational gap between large surface combatants and small patrol craft. The goal was to project U.S. naval power into the shallow, congested coastal waters where large ships were vulnerable to attack, and to do so quickly and flexibly with minimal crews. Two distinct classes were developed, the Freedom class and the Independence class, characterized by high speed (over 40 knots), modular mission packages, and minimal armament. Unfortunately, this combination turned out to have a fatal flaw. The mission module did not mature as promised. Machine breakdowns were frequent and costly. The chances of survival against modern threats were slim. Ships were too fragile for high-end combat and too expensive for low-end existence.
Freedom Class LCS
Independent class LCS
Two designs, one program: Built-in vulnerabilities
From its inception, the Littoral Combat Ship program was unusual in that the U.S. Navy approved two disparate ship designs rather than selecting a single platform. This decision reflected both strategic uncertainty and bureaucratic calculations. Officially, the dual-track approach was framed as a competitive procurement strategy aimed at lowering costs, fostering innovation, and allowing the Navy to “narrow down its choices” after real-world testing. The two designs, the Freedom-class littoral combat ship monohull and the Independence-class littoral combat ship trimaran, represented completely different engineering philosophies.
Beneath this rationale is a deeper current. In the early 2000s, the Navy had no clear operational concept for littoral warfare, so authorizing two designs served as a hedge against strategic uncertainty. Political considerations were equally important. Two shipyards, Fincantieri Marinette Marine and Austal USA, meant more support from Congress, more job distribution, and greater resistance to cancellation.
In theory, the Navy planned to select a single design after operational testing. In reality, no such choice was made. Both designs went into series production, creating fragmented fleets with incompatible maintenance and training pipelines, overlapping logistics chains, and inflated lifecycle costs. This dual-design structure magnified all of the program’s shortcomings and is now widely recognized as one of its original strategic mistakes.
The end of gunboat diplomacy
Gunboat diplomacy worked in the past because great powers had ships that could threaten coastal countries with impunity. However, the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) military technology has upended this dynamic. Land-based systems such as the Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missile can attack naval targets in coastal areas. Ballistic and cruise anti-ship missiles like the DF-21D extend the denial zone hundreds of thousands offshore. Swarms of loitering weapons and UAVs provide persistent surveillance and attack capabilities. Advanced air defense and electronic warfare systems make coastal incursions dangerous even for states without traditional navies.
LCS is poorly suited to the modern threat environment. Designed for speed and flexibility, they are lightly equipped, have minimal protection, and rely on modules that do not deliver the promised functionality. Disputed coasts such as the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea, and the Caribbean will face multilayered threats from land-based missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and submarines. This technological change means that U.S. naval presence is no longer a cheap, low-risk form of enforcement. That’s a potentially expensive liability.
Converging Failure: Program Development and Foreign Policy Strategy
The Littoral Combat Ship program failed not because of a single mistake, but because of a combination of flawed procurement practices and outdated foreign policy assumptions. On the procurement side, the plan was shaped by the belief that naval power projection would remain largely uncontested on the world’s coasts. The resulting ship prioritized speed, modularity, and cost efficiency over combat effectiveness, survivability, and lethality. Technical efforts were made in hopes that advanced mission modules would compensate for the lack of organic capabilities, but those hopes never materialized.
Meanwhile, U.S. diplomatic strategy continued to rely on the logic of gunboat diplomacy, assuming that the visible presence of U.S. warships would translate into political influence. This strategic stance was formulated during the era of unipolar rule and has persisted even as the global environment changes. While the Navy was building specialized, fragile ships optimized for permissive operations, potential adversaries were acquiring advanced anti-access/area denial systems, precision strike capabilities, and unmanned platforms capable of threatening U.S. surface ships at low cost.
These two failures reinforced each other. A poorly designed platform running an outdated strategy launched at a time when that strategy no longer worked. As it turns out, LCS was more than just a procurement failure. It has become a strategic anachronism, emblematic of how procurement dysfunction, institutional inertia, and geopolitical complacency can produce weapons systems that become obsolete as soon as they enter service.
Venezuela and the limits of US naval coercion
The Trump administration is developing a military strategy aimed at overthrowing the Maduro regime. A U.S. naval coercion operation against Venezuela would have been easy in 1990, but not today. Venezuela does not have a blue-water navy that can compete with the U.S. fleet, but it doesn’t need one. An arsenal of land-based missiles, air defense systems, and surveillance systems would create a zone of denial, making operations by lightly armed ships like the LCS dangerous. Even a large US navy would encounter significant resistance from Venezuela.
C-802 anti-ship missile
This change is not unique to Venezuela. Currently, dozens of small and medium-sized states possess advanced precision weapons and integrated defense networks. Deterrence, once the preserve of great powers, has been democratized. The assumption that U.S. ships can sail freely on foreign shores is no longer reliable. Precision missile proliferation reduces the cost of effective deterrence. Unmanned systems provide surveillance and attack capabilities without the need for expensive fleets. Electronic warfare and radar illumination undermine U.S. advantages in early warning and maneuver. The failure of the LCS program reflects the new reality that coastal waters are no longer uncontested.
Missile operations in Yemen: Evidence of the failure of gunboat diplomacy
If the Littoral Combat Ship program represents a conceptual failure of gunboat diplomacy, the Yemeni missile campaign represents its operational collapse. Since late 2023, the U.S. and allied navies have maintained a strong presence in the Red Sea, deploying advanced surface combat aircraft and carrier strike groups to deter and destroy attacks on international shipping. But despite overwhelming firepower, air cover, and relentless surveillance, Ansar Allah’s operations continue largely unabated.
Yemen is not a large country. It does not have a blue-water navy. Its forces rely primarily on mobile launchers, anti-ship cruise missiles, and UAVs, many of which are inexpensive or supplied through external networks. These weapons are dispersed and hidden, allowing weaker attackers to bypass the U.S. Navy’s forward presence and disrupt global shipping lanes.
This situation reveals a new strategic situation. Naval presence no longer guarantees coercive control. Modern land attack systems are more durable, more maneuverable, and more affordable than traditional deployments. A single missile battery costs a fraction of the cost of a U.S. destroyer and can pose just as much of a threat. This asymmetry is precisely why gunboat diplomacy cannot survive. The Red Sea campaign made visible the inevitability of the LCS. In other words, the era of intimidation by offshore warships is over.
Recognizing LCS failures
The US Navy has quietly acknowledged the failure of its Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Although it was originally planned to produce more than 50 vessels, many of these vessels were scheduled for early retirement by the mid-2020s, some with less than 10 years of service, as their current operational use proved to be very limited.
Senior Navy leadership has testified before Congress, acknowledging that ships cannot survive in conflict environments. The budget justification document shifted resources from LCS modernization to more capable frigate and destroyer programs. The mission module, once a central innovation, was effectively abandoned due to repeated cost overruns and technical failures. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan reclassified the majority of LCS hulls as noncombatant or auxiliary assets. Some LCS hulls have been retired early and are kept in reserve or used for parts salvage. Some have been offered to foreign allies for transfer or training purposes. A small number are maintained for low-intensity missions such as anti-drug patrols in permissive environments.
conclusion
LCS is more than a failed warship project. It is a monument to strategic complacency, a ship designed for a world that no longer exists. The early retirement of LCS ships signals that the era of easy naval coercion is over. Gunboat diplomacy relied on overwhelming, low-cost, and reliable force projection. That calculus is dead. Precision weapons have leveled the field. Future U.S. maritime strategy must recognize that the projection of naval power cannot be taken for granted. The next time the U.S. government sends a warship to “send a message,” it risks an unpleasant reaction.
