Recent reports about preliminary negotiations for a military alliance between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan raise an underappreciated risk. Similar concerns arise from Israel’s expanded security cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and its reported engagement with Somaliland, developments that could sharpen regional rivalries and suggest offsetting coordination efforts by Somalia involving Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Concerns about the rise of alliance formation in the Middle East are often dismissed with the common argument that regional states have a long history of failure to cooperate. Alliances in the past were informal, weak, and marred by conflict. Seen from this perspective, the new Middle East Defense Agreement and Collective Security Declaration are more symbolic than consequential. Therefore, they are not considered worthy of serious concern.
This reasoning leads risk almost exactly in the opposite direction. What makes these alliances dangerous is not their strength or cohesion. That is their weakness. Weak alliances create uncontrollable ambiguity. They indicate a common purpose without establishing clear command authority, escalation thresholds, or restraint mechanisms. While these encourage participants to act as if support exists, they leave open the question of who can prevent excesses once the situation unfolds. In a region already saturated with unresolved conflicts, this combination is inherently destabilizing.
2025 Saudi-Pakistan Mutual Defense Treaty – Enhanced security or increased risk?
Why weak alliances increase the risk of escalation
Strong alliances can deter or manage conflict by clarifying commitments and enforcing discipline. Weak or informal alliances do the opposite. These increase conflict risk in several ways.
First, weak alliances increase interpretation without strengthening authority. Each participant and each rival observer must infer what commitments actually exist. Behaviors that one actor views as providing symbolic reassurance may be interpreted by other actors as a test of resolve or trustworthiness. The lack of clear escalation rules means signaling takes place instead of strategy.
Second, weak alliances lower the barrier to adventurism. States may engage in risky behavior even in the absence of formal obligations, believing that their partners will be drawn in through reputational pressure. Signals of alliance substitute for coordination and encourage behavior that is limited by fear of isolation.
Third, and most dangerous, weak alliances prolong conflicts without resolving them. The conflict is likely to remain indecisive, as alliance members lack the power to force restraint or decisive action. It is precisely this condition that historically invites outside intervention.
Thucydides’ pattern: weak coalitions and external intervention
The classic illustration comes from the Peloponnesian War. Athens ultimately fell, not because the Spartan league had overwhelming internal cohesion, but because the long conflict created the conditions for Persian intervention. Persia did not intervene out of ideological consensus or moral preference. When it became clear that Athenian supremacy could be checked but not conclusively reversed by Greek forces alone, he opportunistically intervened and provided funds to Sparta.
This pattern repeats itself throughout history. External powers enter conflicts not when one side clearly has the upper hand, but when the outcome is uncertain but strategically important due to a prolonged struggle. This intervention is driven by opportunity, not alliance loyalty. Later examples follow the same logic. France only entered the American Revolution after Saratoga showed that Britain could be challenged but not immediately defeated. The only time Britain seriously considered intervening in the Civil War was if it became protracted and seemed inconclusive. In both cases, the decisive actors were not the main belligerents from the outset, but external powers drawn in by strategic opportunity.
The lesson is clear. Weak or fragmented alliances do not weaken conflict. They magnify it and increase the likelihood that outside forces will intervene to shape the outcome. Applying this logic to the Middle East is deeply worrying. Loose regional coalitions are unlikely to lead to quick solutions. Instead, it risks provoking an expansive and ambiguous conflict that invites escalating intervention by outside powers such as the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China, each with their own strategic calculations. In the nuclear age, such interventions carried great risks.
escalation trigger
This dynamic becomes especially dangerous because escalation does not require an extraordinary event. This arises from routine military and security incidents that would be manageable under a clearer authority structure. Shooting down planes, seizing ships, declaring no-fly zones, and naval blockades are nothing new. It occurs regularly in conflict zones. However, when alliance conditions are weak, these incidents quickly reconstitute themselves as tests of alliances rather than isolated conflicts. Shooting down an aircraft is a sure challenge. The capture of a ship is a test of collective resolve. A no-fly zone declared without uniform enforcement is an invitation to investigation. Official or de facto blockades turn from limited enforcement measures into regional contests over prestige and access. Because alliance commitments are vague, responses are improvised. Symbolic gestures are linked to military deployments. A signal intended to stop will in turn cause a countersignal. Escalation happens not because someone plans it, but because no one has clear control over it.
Nuclear synthesis without nuclear intent
These risks fundamentally change when nuclear-armed states become involved, even indirectly. Nuclear weapons do not need to be deployed or even seriously considered to shape crisis behavior. The presence of nuclear-capable actors increases the risk of miscalculation, shortens the timeline for decisions, and increases the fear of abandonment or encirclement. Countries may feel pressure to strengthen signaling early to avoid appearing weak and with narrow exits before it is fully visible. Nuclear capabilities are not an option of last resort, but rather a psychological anchor in crisis recognition. This becomes particularly unstable when nuclear-armed participants are embedded in weak alliance structures that generate without guarantees of expectations. Ambiguity becomes intolerable precisely because the cost of misreading it is perceived to be very high.
Volatility as a regional risk multiplier
All these structural risks are amplified by the historical instability of Middle Eastern state security perceptions. Several countries in the region operate on the principle, explicitly or implicitly, of treating even limited military challenges as potentially existential. This direction is not unreasonable. Many regional states were formed through war, territorial disputes, or sudden political ruptures. Borders, regimes, and governing institutions have faced collapse, external intervention, or both time and time again. As a result, decision-makers often interpret military incidents not as negotiable conflicts but as potential precursors to escalation that threaten the regime. In such an environment, even vague alliances do not provide peace of mind. It intensifies fear. Weak alliances increase fear of abandonment and encourage dangerous expressions of commitment. A limited incident can quickly be reframed as a struggle for survival rather than a problem to be contained.
escalation trap
The central danger, therefore, is not any particular alliance, nor the prospect that regional countries will suddenly find unprecedented military cohesion. This is an increased risk of escalation in areas where worst-case interpretations are likely. As overlapping, informal, and evolving Middle East alliances proliferate, the risk of escalation increases non-linearly. Each new security relationship adds interpretive channels, recognized obligations, and opportunities for opportunistic intervention. There is no single entity controlling the escalation logic. Even limited conflicts acquire disproportionate strategic meaning.
conclusion
The emerging Middle East alliance should not be ignored just because it is weak. They should be taken seriously, especially in regions where existential threat perceptions and nuclear capabilities are a salient concern, as their vulnerabilities increase ambiguity, encourage risk-taking, and magnify the consequences of miscalculation. In such situations, forming alliances does not necessarily enhance security. Rather, it could double the likelihood that a localized crisis will escalate into a broader conflict. For outside powers, the danger lies not only in the intentions of these alliances, but also in how they interact with already unstable regional politics. Without sustained efforts to de-escalate tensions and delineate the boundaries of escalating tensions, the pursuit of security through a new Middle East alliance may ultimately backfire rather than limit the risk of strategic catastrophe.
