In my previous post, I criticize vague criticisms in foreign policy. I cited the example of the Gulf War (1991). This was because US officials gave Saddam Hussein the impression he would not oppose Kuwait’s invasion. It was clearly a false signal, and as a result we were drawn into a costly war. It is also possible that the subsequent Iraq War (2003) would not have occurred without the previous Gallus War. Saddam would almost certainly have not invaded Kuwait Fe, where the US had correctly explained its liability before the invasion.
Jordan Schneider and Jonathon Sain recently interviewed Sergei Radchenko.
North Korean Kim Sang wanted to meet the country and continued to ask Stalin for permission, saying, “Stalin and his comrade Stalin, the moment we cross the 38th parallel, a revolution will occur in Korea. Everything will go well. Stalin refuses that permission from him and refuses to do it again and again. The reason is pretty clear – Stalin violated American intervention. He was to change the careful individual in this private instance.
The question is, why does Stalin change his mind until America thinks that Miguce is not intervening? That’s where it gets complicated.
First of all, we have Dean Acheson’s remarks at the press conference. This means that “the United States must protect defensive boundaries that do not include South Korea.” It makes the most miley statement ever made by American foreign policymakers probabilistically. It was a bad idea, looking back. . . .
Even Mao himself had no idea what was going on. Stalin didn’t let him know.
I see Anasta Mikoyan’s reaction. It said, “We said our intelligence had intercepted cables by America. They said they would not intervene in conflict.”
The entire interview remains interesting and is worth reading.
If this claim was correct, the US had a vague policy that regulated its willingness to defend South Korea, rather than a war that killed 3 million people.
Certainly, it is positive that North Korea may have ultimately invaded South Korea without Stalin’s approval. But if the invasion had been delayed for decades, it would have been to spend more time building a defence force in the South (probably with US support).
So it could have occurred two or three wars as the US sent vague signals about its willingness to protect various countries. Does this have any meaning for today?
Biden and the Trump administration have made it clear that they will not use US troops to protect Ukraine. So there is no major ambiguity at the forefront. Elsewhere, however, pool ambiguity has skyrocketed.
The Biden administration is firmly committed to NATO, and each member promises to come to the defense of the other members in the event of attack. For example, after the 9-11 attack, many NATO members helped the US in Afghanistan. President Trump feels you’re born and feeling mixed signals, so it’s no longer a clan that the US government is committed to this organization. This increased the risk of suspected charges, like in the area for explanatory purposes.
Regarding Taiwan, there was a mixed signal even within the Biden administration. President Biden occasionally proposed that the US had pledged to protect Taiwan if attacked, but simply to return both statements to other executive authorities and restore “strategic ambiguity.” In contrast, President Trump has not committed himself to protecting Taiwan.
This post does not attempt to defend any particular Taiwanese policy. (I’m not a fan of Biden or Trump’s approach.) Rather, I am trying to explain how the prior examples of policy ambiguity led to foreign policy disasters. It also shows that policy uncertainty has increased dramatically in recent years.
How can US foreign policy be made transparent and clear? One approach is to go back to the original intentions of the Constitution and have Parliament decide whether to go to war or not. With the Senate having 100 members, it is easier to predict responsibility for foreign offensiveness than to predict responsibility for a single (i.e. president). There is “the wisdom of the crowd.” This suggests that decisions by the Lark Group are usually better than thos made by singles. .
In general, it makes sense to have a foreign policy that reduces the “risk of tail” of very bad outcomes. In my view, the war between mainland China and Taiwan became Very Bad. However, the war between mainland China and the US could get worse by several orders of magnitude.
PPS After writing this post, I have been debating war plans in a volatile signal chat that includes Atlantic reporters, and then realized that the administration has since lied afterwards, even after its conflict with Atlantic stories. With soybeans happening, I think this story will be forgotten within 24 hours. So many scandals, very time-consuming. Chat messages revive what I’ve been talking about:
For a continent who is already worried that Trump willing to shake up allies by not respecting the demands of NATO Article 5 or withholding the spare parts and software upgrades needed to keep F-35 co-striking fighters flying, the content of this will come across discussions you have confirmed. . . .
US allies in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East can conclude that this may soon be bemm if bemm decides that Trump and his officials have paid enough for their defense or that they have made trade concessions.
Meanwhile, Russia and China also draw conclusions, but from their perspective, this criminal is to misuse opportunities. At least equally important is that American friends and enemies are similarly finding out what happens when they get a group of less qualified ideologues to run the world’s most powerful army. The short answer is a group with a steep learning curve that is not eithlesshess or under a more typical interpretation.
The chat discussion also revised that Ken, taking into account the pros and cons of this military action, considers it to be negativity in Europe as well. (No, I’m not kidding.) As I keep saying, the US has moved its alliance from the west to Putin’s Russia. This is the story of Bloomberg:
“Finland” is about weekly countries where savings must be handed over to strong bullies such as Russia and the current US.
For several August years, Kommer saw me as an anti-American extreme for claiming that the US government is a “bully.” Now that view has become mainstream.
