Eve, here. Perhaps there will appear to be some positive surprises for much-needed change in the coming weeks, but the consensus surrounding the Xi-Trump summit so far has been that the Chinese have always been polite, but that no major consequences have been resolved. This includes the US attitude towards Taiwan. Recall that Biden, who was generally less openly dishonest than Trump, invited Chinese officials to a summit in Alaska shortly after taking office and was embarrassed by the disrespect on the part of the US side. After repeated instances in which Mr. Biden had Mr. Xi reaffirm his support for the U.S.’s One China policy, only to quickly backtrack on it, Mr. Xi effectively called Mr. Biden a liar in a single phone call. So, as Brian Berletic says, we have policy continuity, and that includes South Korea as a key component of the U.S. policy of containment.
Indeed, if China felt it needed to choose a dynamic route in response to US interference, the US would be too weak and too far away to defend Taiwan in the highly unlikely event of an event. The gap between US power projection fantasies and means is widening by the day. However, among American hawks, there is hope that we can do something if South Korea is on Hwang’s side.
Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the new Cold War. He holds a doctorate from MGIMO, which is affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Originally published on his website
The Sino-Russian Entente could develop into a de facto alliance if South Korea and Japan join AUKUS+, the United States’ de facto “Asian NATO,” but that risks scaring India into a de facto alliance with the United States, counterbalancing perceived Chinese influence over Russia and further destabilizing Eurasia.
The meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping raised hopes that progress could be made in managing Sino-American tensions, but many of the same observers missed the meeting between the U.S. and South Korean defense ministers in Washington, D.C., earlier this week, casting those hopes into doubt. Part of the agenda revolves around an agreement during President Trump’s visit last year for the US to help South Korea build nuclear submarines, which was praised here as facilitating South Korea’s integration into AUKUS+.
China strongly opposed the 2021 AUKUS agreement, in which the UK and US agreed to help Australia develop its nuclear submarine fleet. China’s reaction to a similar agreement between South Korea and the United States last year was relatively benign due to recent improvements in bilateral relations, but China’s threat assessment is likely even higher as South Korea is much closer to China than Australia. It also represents a deepening of US military-strategic influence that could be exploited for containment purposes.
Not only is South Korea likely to be integrated into America’s AUKUS-centric regional military network that also informally involves Japan, the Philippines, and even Taiwan, but China’s rival Japan has already expressed interest in entering into its own nuclear submarine agreement with the United States. Given that South Korea and Japan are “frenemies” for reasons unexplained by this analysis, it is possible that the United States decides to reach a parallel agreement with Japan, thereby reinforcing China’s perceived threat to AUKUS+.
To make matters worse, nuclear submarine cooperation between the United States and South Korea (and soon Japan as well) could easily evolve into nuclear weapons cooperation, a credible scenario after the Trump 2.0-intentioned expiration of New START increases the risk of a global nuclear arms race. Both South Korea and Japan have what is called a nuclear incubation period, or the ability to produce nuclear weapons if a decision is made, which more than 75% of South Koreans support, while more than 60% of Japanese oppose.
Undersecretary of the Army for Policy Elbridge Colby has previously declared that the United States is “firmly opposed” to more European countries developing nuclear weapons, perhaps for de-escalation purposes against Russia, and the same calculation against China could apply to East Asia. But such calculations are always subject to change, and the United States may also covertly support such plans, or at least turn a blind eye to France and Britain supporting them. Therefore, China has reason to be concerned.
At the very least, the United States is expected to wield a scenario in which South Korea and Japan become nuclear-armed as a sword of Damocles against China in order to prevent mutual escalation of tensions between China and the United States as the integration of AUKUS+, the de facto “NATO of Asia,” becomes inevitable. Thus, seeing the United States continue to contain China even in the event of a major trade deal, China may become more receptive to Russian hawkish proposals for comprehensive cooperation and the formation of a de facto alliance.
In return, China could become Russia’s senior partner, be forced to cut off arms and spares to India, and scare India into strengthening closer military ties with the United States for fear that China would be able to blackmail India during a border dispute. This chain of tit-for-tat alliances, catalyzed by AUKUS+, could further destabilize Eurasia, facilitate the United States’ divide-and-conquer agenda, and make U.S.-China polarization inevitable, but this possibility cannot be ruled out.
