For most of the post-World War II period, the United States maintained a set of institutional boundaries designed to control the use of military force. War was understood to be exceptional, geographically limited, legally regulated, and publicly accountable. Intelligence agencies collected and evaluated information. The armed forces waged war under declared authority and in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. Covert action existed, but as a marginal and politically dangerous exception rather than a form of governance.
Over the past two decades, these boundaries have been steadily eroded in the United States. The result is not just a more assertive national security posture, but a shift in how force itself is authorized, used, and justified. Wars have become increasingly divorced from formal declarations, legal clarity, and public accountability. U.S. reliance on military action has become the norm, a permanent and flexible policy tool rather than an anomaly requiring Congressional approval or legal binding. This shift reflects a convergence of increasing secrecy, flexible legal powers, and institutional incentives that favor action over restraint.
Take Venezuela as an example
The recent US attack on Venezuela provides a useful example of this shift. Public reports and statements are characterized by ambiguity, including unclear operational roles, uncertain legal authority, and heavy reliance on deniability. The key here is not so much whether a particular operation will ultimately prove legal or illegal, but rather the fact that its legal basis, chain of authority, and evaluation framework are unclear by design.
The distinction between war and non-war is already beginning to dissolve when it is difficult to determine whether an operation falls under military authority, intelligence, law enforcement, proxy action, or a hybrid thereof. The question is no longer simply what happened, but even how it should be evaluated. The attack on Venezuela shows that U.S. military planning increasingly operates in a gray zone, where secrecy and legal boundaries are treated as adjustable substitutes for responsibility.
Armed Reaper Drone – CIA Asset?
disappearing norms
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States’ national security agencies operated, at least formally, within more clearly defined roles and constraints. Intelligence agencies focused primarily on collection, analysis, and influence. The military conducted overt operations under Title 10 of the United States Code, which was incorporated into the chain of command established by the laws of war. Although covert action existed, it was temporary, politically sensitive, and treated as an exceptional deviation from normal practice rather than a permanent use of force.
The post-9/11 environment has shifted that balance in subtler but more significant ways. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force did not openly declare global or permanent war. Instead, it delegated to the executive branch the power to decide who the enemy is, without specifying geographic boundaries, temporal boundaries, or mechanisms for reconsidering those decisions. That delegation, combined with the global counterterrorism framework, created a durable framework for administrative discretion free from defined enemies and clearly demarcated conflicts.
Over time, what began as an emergency response to a specific attack solidified into a permanent framework for exercising discretion. The Central Intelligence Agency, historically an intelligence and influence organization, has gained permanent access to paramilitary and kinetic capabilities through covert action authorities. Lethal operations that once required special justification have become commonplace. Geographical limitations faded as the concept of a global battlefield took hold. Time constraints were no longer present, as the conflict was treated as ongoing by definition rather than by circumstance.
This transformation was not the result of a single decision or a clear repudiation of previous norms. It emerged from the accumulation of precedents. Each individually is legally defensible and justified as a necessary adaptation, but collectively they are corrosive. The boundaries between exceptional wartime powers and normal governance steadily eroded as enemy designation, operational scope, and conflict duration moved from legislative definitions to administrative decisions.
Title 10 and Title 50 legal authorities
At the heart of this transformation is an important distinction between two sections of U.S. statute law. Title 10 governs the military. It presupposes open military operations, a clear chain of command, enforceable rules of engagement, and formal observance of the laws of armed conflict. Title 50 governs intelligence activities, including covert actions, is intentionally centered around covert actions and deniability, and limits oversight to select Congressional committees.
The CIA’s founding law did not envision it as an armed or combat agency. Created by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA was designed as a civilian intelligence agency focused on collection, analysis, and coordination. While the law authorized the president to direct “other intelligence-related functions,” it was premised on a clear separation between intelligence activities and the use of force, which remains the military’s authority. The ensuing escalation of lethal CIA-led operations represents not a realization of this plan but a departure from it, undertaken without the inclusion of a legal and ethical framework governing the war.
Both authorities are legitimate. The problem arises when deadly force moves from the Title 10 framework to Title 50 without normative constraints. Chapter 10 states that the laws of war are not arbitrary guidelines. They are structurally embedded through training, doctrine, and enforced accountability. Under Title 50, even if formally recognized, the same norms are difficult to enforce in practice. From an operational perspective, the changes can be subtle. The same personnel may operate in the same area, using the same weapons, and against the same targets. What changes is the legal packaging, and with it the mechanisms that make suppression meaningful rather than aspirational.
institutions that integrate
This immigration power is strengthened by the growing convergence between intelligence agencies, elite special operations forces, and conventional military forces. Over the past two decades, operational distinctions have become blurred. Intelligence-led missions increasingly resemble military operations. Military forces increasingly operate under intelligence agencies.
Elite military formations, such as units operating under Joint Special Operations Command, operate at the intersection of these frameworks. Although their personnel are members of the military and trained in the laws of war, their duties may be carried out under secret authorities designed for secrecy rather than battlefield responsibilities. Oversight becomes fragmented as operations shift between Title 10 and Title 50 regimes. The result is a gray area where responsibility is diffused, attribution is contested, and where constraints rely more on internal discretion than on enforceable rules.
This institutional convergence creates greater risks. When intelligence agencies have permanent kinetic powers, analysis itself is restructured. Intelligence no longer functions solely to inform decision makers. It becomes oriented toward enabling action. Evidence is evaluated in terms of feasibility rather than constraints. Uncertainty becomes a justification for the use of force, not a reason for vigilance. Secrecy exacerbates this distortion. When decision-making is isolated from external oversight, there is little corrective pressure to distinguish between intelligence assessment and operational advocacy. Even if the operation is successful, the quality of decision-making can deteriorate by reinforcing the system in which actions validate the analysis after the fact.
erosion of the laws of war
The law of armed conflict only works if it is systematically enforced. They rely on clear combatant status, transparent command accountability, acceptance of surrender, and post-action accountability. Title 10 makes these requirements explicit. For example, an order to “take no prisoners” is illegal, and U.S. military personnel are obligated to refuse the order.
Covert lethal action undermines this structure not by overtly violating the laws of war, but by circumventing the conditions that trigger them. Intelligence agencies are not organized around battlefield transparency or public accountability. Their governing obligations – secrecy, deniability, and mission success – are fundamentally at odds with the norms of military conflict. As secret lethality becomes the norm, legal exceptions pile up. Over time, the exception becomes the rule and restraint becomes discretionary rather than structural. The danger is not that war crimes will be ordered, but that the clear line of stopping them will fade from operational relevance.
Erosion of laws within the country
Its influence extends beyond foreign policy. Institutional customs travel. Once normalized abroad, resilient authority, secrecy, and exceptionalism find parallels at home in government surveillance, policing, and control of protests. The boundaries between external defense and internal governance are weakened not by intrigue but by organizational drift. Militarism is not “coming back” as a deliberate plan. This occurs as a result of government practices that are allowed to operate without oversight or legal restrictions.
conclusion
Venezuela is not an isolated military operation. That’s a symptom. An even more serious danger lies in national security systems that wage wars without regard to the rules of war. Use force without democratic constraints. And legal boundaries are treated as adjustable rather than constitutive. You don’t have to give up safety to regain control. We need to reaffirm the institutional distinctions and safeguards that once made restraint enforceable. without restoring a clear distinction between intelligence and war. Secrecy and accountability. Given its authority and legitimacy, the United States risks falling into a state of permanent war without boundaries.
