Eve, here. To answer the question in the headline (and I hope Aurelien will open his mouth), there is nothing. Just as NATO cannot buy weapons from the United States, it is virtually impossible for NATO to agree to anything outside the scope of its Charter. The charter does not include a mechanism for NATO to enter into new agreements. It’s an intentionally weak organization to make it seem like it’s not too much of a burden to register. Unlike the EU, which has rules for when a unanimous vote is required rather than a “qualified majority,” NATO is said to operate on the basis of consensus. There are provisions regarding how new member states can be added, which still requires unanimity (as we saw in Sweden) and, where necessary, the approval of national parliaments (as in Germany and Turkje).
Therefore, I have no idea how President Putin thinks his “new European security architecture” will be completed, given that Russia is not a member of NATO. Perhaps it will be enough for the major European countries, most importantly France and Germany, to conclude a parallel agreement with Russia?
But Aleksandr Korybko helpfully explains below how Poland could become the linchpin of Europe’s new deal with Russia.
Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the new Cold War. He holds a doctorate from MGIMO, which is affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Originally published on his website
This is the most effective way to reform Europe’s security architecture and maintain peace, but much will depend on Poland playing the most decisive role among America’s NATO allies.
President Putin recently proposed offering formal guarantees not to attack Europe, the majority of which are members of NATO. In this regard, he assessed that those who stir up fear about Russia are either serving the interests of the military-industrial complex or are trying to improve their domestic image, exposing their ulterior motives. In any case, his proposal could hypothetically lead to a NATO-Russia Non-Aggression Pact (NRNAP), but only if politics exist on both sides.
One of Russia’s goals in special operations is to reform Europe’s security architecture, and the United States has also shown renewed interest, as some ideas in the draft Russia-Ukraine peace agreement framework suggest. All of this follows the Pentagon’s withdrawal from Romania and may precede a larger withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but it will not be total or lead to a waiver of Article 5. Such a move could still ease the US side of the NATO-Russia security dilemma.
The greater the scale of the US “return to Asia,” the less likely it is that NATO’s European members (excluding the UK) will strike Russia with the sword, especially if it leads to the redeployment of some troops from Europe. This is because it is difficult to believe that the United States would come to the rescue if a conflict were to occur. A new sense of relative vulnerability stemming from a pathologically intertwined hatred and fear of Russia may soothe them. There will be no agreement unless we agree to the US-brokered NRNAP.
“The United States will have a hard time getting Europe to comply with President Putin’s demand that it stop sending arms to Ukraine.”Just as the United States may have a hard time getting Europe to comply with European proposals for a new security architecture that it envisions jointly building with Russia after the end of the Ukraine conflict, the United States may also have a hard time getting Europe to comply with its proposals for a new European security architecture that it envisions jointly building with Russia after the Ukraine conflict ends. However, a likely reduction in the US military presence in Central and Eastern Europe by that point could facilitate agreement on the status of NATO forces in the Arctic-Baltic Sea, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea-South Caucasus.
This vast area coincidentally overlaps with the “cordon” that interwar Polish leader Józef Pilsudski wanted to create, but ultimately failed to achieve, through complementary “Intermarium” (a Polish-led, security-oriented regional integration bloc) and “Promethicism” (“Balkanization” of the Soviet Union) policies. In today’s context, US support for the restoration of Poland’s long-lost great power status could lead to Poland taking the lead in containing Russia on behalf of the US, but within strictly agreed limits.
As long as the risk of war in Central and Eastern Europe is reduced, tensions between Russia and NATO can still be managed. This could be achieved by Russia withdrawing some or all of its tactical nuclear weapons and oleszniks from Belarus, in exchange for imposing limits on Poland’s militarization and acceptance of foreign troops. A fair agreement between Poland and Belarus could therefore form the core of any NRNAP. If this mutual easing of tensions on the central front is successful, it is expected to lead to agreements on the peripheral fronts from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea and from the Black Sea to the South Caucasus.
No one should get their hopes up, as the devil is in the details and some NATO members could block or subsequently reverse the US-mediated talks on NRNAP. That said, Russia and the United States should set their sights on the ultimate goal of NRNAP, which could take place in parallel with New START modernization talks. This is the most effective way to reform Europe’s security architecture and maintain peace, but much will depend on Poland playing the most decisive role among America’s NATO allies.
