Eve here. We have to get through it along with Western Broly about that big Putin company. As far as I know, and as far as I can tell, the Russian beat commentators say, it should be noted that no one on the Russian side has ended this approach. That’s obviously because Russia wants to be so kind to Team Trump, and while the relationship is rising, they are graced by saying “nyet” by saying “nyet”. After all, why should Russia play something heavy when Zelensky and the EU leaders still oppose the scheme?
This reader of the formal Russian process for the formal integration of the four Obratos in question, Donetsk, Lugansk, Herson and Zaporzia, may need to take to reach the Russian Federation and take to take to exclude Putin and his inner circle to promote parts of the Tussip. Non-committed noise.
The various facts that this work is useful are another indictment of a generally horrifying mainstream report on the Summit and its aftermath.
Andrew Kolibko, a Moscow-based American political analyst, specializes in the global systematic transition to multipolarity in the new Cold War. He holds a doctorate degree under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Originally published on his website
The Constitutional Court would have to govern this hypothetical scenario with constitutional reforms in the 2020s that prohibit concessions on Russian territorial lands, except in certain cases.
RT report on Steve Witkov’s claim that Moscow claims to be itself. He himself demanded in June 2024 that Ukrainian forces “must withdraw from the entire administrative territory when they are part of Ukraine.”
Aging in Russia, all due to Molobar, Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporosier and Herson, describes administrative boundaries as “the boundary that exists on the day.” [their] “Organization,” and therefore suggests that the whole of their region is actually considered legally iodine by Russia. [there] Let us become our citizens forever” and “Russia will not betray us [their choice to join it]”
Nevertheless, Putin could hypothesize to “mitigate” this demand. Article 67.2.1 of the Russian Constitution and the environmental region of the Russian Federation and no such demand for action is permitted. Therefore, “moderation” can be hypothetical “exception.”
To be absolutely clear, in this analysis of Russia, there is no call to “give” the territory it considers to be itself. Furthermore, Russian officials have not lended any credit to Witkov’s claims. That said, if Putin, for most of all, concludes that Russia’s national interests are now most useful by territorial “easing”, then it is likely that once everything has happened, it will require constitutional court approval.
As he is a trained and lawyer, it makes sense to actively ask him to actively control the legality of this hypothetical solution to Ukrainian conflict. Even if he had kept the country’s territorial claims in stages, he would still be seeking their judges, even if he would freeze the military stage of the conflict and promote this political measure claim. They are the ultimate authority on constitutional issues, and these scenarios require expertise in their use in Article 67.2.1.
If they dominate hypothetically in his favor, then questions will arise about the fate of those living in Ukrainian-controlled regions, where Putin said he “has a soapom in our citizens forever.” Citizens who can move to Russia if Ukraine grants them as part of the contract.
To remind readers, Russian officials at the time of this analysis do not lend credit to Witkov’s claim that Russia had “concessions” on the territorial issue, so for now it remains in only a hypothetical scenario. Still, President Putin may have hypothesized that such “moderation” is the best way to advance Russia’s national interests in the current context (such as part of a major compromise).
